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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to present and evaluate interest rate policies of 
three selected central banks in Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary) from 2001 to 2013. The study consists of an introduction 
(Section 1) and three main parts. The introduction contains a theoretical 
description of the role of interest rate policy, the dilemmas connected with it, as 
well as an analysis of the strategies and goals of monetary policies of the 
National Bank of Poland (NBP), the Czech National Bank (CzNB), and the 
National Bank of Hungary (NBH) in the context of existing legal and institutional 
conditions. In turn, the first empirical part (Section 2) examines how the 
analysed central banks responded to changes in inflation, unemployment, and 
economic growth rates. The tools of the analysis are the nominal and real interest 
rates of those banks. The subsequent research part (Section 3) attempts to evaluate 
the degree of the contractionary nature of interest rate policies in specific countries 
in the context of the Taylor rule. The text ends with a summary (Section 4) 
encompassing concise conclusions drawn from the earlier analyses. 
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1. Introduction  
Monetary policy, the primary tool of which is interest rate policy, faces 
the difficult issue of having to constantly choose an optimum strategy. When 
setting the goals of monetary policy, several paths can be chosen. One of those 
can be characterized by lower inflation at the expense of slower economic 
growth, while the other – higher inflation but, at the same time, a more rapid 
rise in production. The choice between those two paths is often political and 
depends on preferences of the country’s authorities and their appraisal of the 
country’s socio-economic situation (Fedorowicz 2000, pp. 87-89). 
In the European Union countries, the euro area establishment project 
contributed to an assumption that, in principal, the sole objective of central 
banks is to maintain the value of currency. Therefore, the EU member states were 
somehow forced to consider price stabilization to be the top priority of economic 
policy. That certainly may give rise to controversy as, in some countries, the socio-
economic costs of that kind of disinflation policy are undoubtedly high. The 
countries that get caught in the “low inflation trap” are mainly those where inflation 
tolerance is higher and which could develop faster, were they not forced to meet the 
a priori imposed low inflation objective (Bednarczyk, Sobol 2011, pp. 36-41). 
At this point, it is worth emphasizing that, according to the economic 
literature, various goals can be set for interest rate policy. Apart from combating 
inflation, they may include, among others: effective allocation of a country’s 
economic resources (Borowiec 1994, pp. 274-275), increasing domestic savings, 
increasing effectiveness of investment, managing domestic demand, attracting 
additional foreign capital, increasing demand for financial assets (Walerysiak 
1997, pp. 793-799), stabilization of the economy and stimulation of structural 
transformations (Nowak, Ryć, Żyżyński 1997, p. 443), and even stimulation of 
economic growth. Some of those goals are closely connected with the inflation 
objective (based on the principle of complementarity), whereas others (especially 
the last one) substitute, to some degree, price level stabilization. 
It is worth noting, however, that even if the inflation goal is considered to 
be the sole aim, a high interest rate policy may, anyway, not always be the most 
appropriate inasmuch as high interest rates – due to the fact that their nominal 
level is usually set a little above the forecast inflation rate – have a stimulating 
impact on inflation expectations. 
It should also be emphasized that the interest rate affects numerous other 
variables – both in the product and money market – and thus, when 
manipulating its level, effects may be brought about that are not always matched 
to expectations. Taking into account the pursuit of an interest rate policy as  
a tool to fight inflation, it is very important to precisely determine what kind of 
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factors contribute, to the largest degree, to its increase or at least maintenance at  
a relatively high level as, while high interest rates will actually curb inflation 
when it is pulled by demand, quite an opposite situation may occur when 
inflation is caused mainly by cost factors. This may be due to the fact that high 
interest rates often make enterprises taking out loans try to compensate for their 
considerable costs by raising the prices of their products (Żyżyński 1996, p. 101). 
When analysing the effectiveness of interest rate policy, attention should also 
be paid to the differentiation between the short and long term, which is often 
omitted in the mass media but very important in economics. Expansionary 
monetary policy tends to bring about expected effects, but only in the short run. In 
turn, contractionary policy, associated with disinflation policy, often appears to be 
advantageous in the longer run. That is indicated, inter alia, by empirical research on 
the relationship between inflation, national income, and investment.1 Therefore, 
while pursing an often unpopular inflation-combating policy, some short-term costs 
usually have to be borne in order to later be able to secure long-term advantages. 
Such an assumption was taken, among others, by the European Central 
Bank (ECB) which, in contrast to, for example, the Federal Reserve System (the 
Fed) in the United States, does not practise defining several equally important 
goals. Pursuant to provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(Article 105) the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability. It is 
worth pointing out that similar principles apply to the entire European System of 
Central Banks. Due to the fact that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary 
are all members of this System, the regulations in force in those countries and 
their sets of monetary policy instruments are also similar to those applicable 
within the whole system (Olszewska 2009, pp. 117-125). 
The meeting of an explicitly established goal is to be facilitated by the 
considerable sovereignty of all national central banks of those countries which 
are members or candidate countries of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
Hence, central banks have been forbidden from taking any instructions from 
member state governments or community authorities who, in turn, have been 
prohibited from putting any pressure on those banks in their performance of 
their tasks (Szeląg 2003, p. 47). This separation between bodies carrying out 
monetary policies and those implementing fiscal policies is, in practice, designed to 
limit to a minimum the impact of the government (whose composition, and thus 
also economic policy, may be subject to frequent changes) on monetary policy 
making. That, in turn, is designed to give an appropriate importance to inflation-
                                                 
1
 One of the most comprehensive analyses on this issue was conducted by R. J. Barro, who 
studied more than 100 countries over a period of about 30 years (from 1960 to 1990). The study 
indicates that a rise in the mean inflation rate by 10 percentage points reduces the rate of an 
increase in the real GDP by 0.24 percentage points annually (Barro 1996, pp. 157-159, 167-168). 
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combating policy, the adverse effects of which may lead, among others, to 
limiting the propensity to save and invest and decreasing the real income of the 
society. 
Therefore, more and more countries adopt the so-called direct inflation 
targeting (DIT) strategy, while completely giving up indirect goals. Since 1998 
this kind of strategy has been pursued by the National Bank of Poland and the 
Czech National Bank, and since 2001 – also by the National Bank of Hungary. 
Inflation targets set by central banks are currently: 2.5% in Poland (since 2004), 
2% in the Czech Republic (since 2010), and 3% in Hungary (since 2007).2 
Arguments for choosing an direct inflation targeting strategy in the 
conditions of increasing integration of the analysed economies with the global 
economy were, among others, the ability to publicly verify the direction and 
effectiveness of monetary policy as well as, associated with that aspect, enhancement 
of its reliability and flexibility. The target of having a monetary policy that is clearly 
set and understood by the public is among the pillars of the central bank’s functional 
independence. Along with increasing the reliability of monetary policy, it may also 
contribute to overcoming inflation expectations (NBP 1998, pp. 8-9), being one of 
major factors affecting the rate of increase in general price levels. 
At this point, however, the question arises whether the official announcement 
of pursuing a DIT strategy actually means that the sole goal of monetary policies of 
the analysed central banks is always to combat inflation. There is no doubt that 
it is a primary goal. Nevertheless, it seems that sometimes (especially when the 
inflation goal is not threatened and the economy falls into recession or crisis) 
central banks should also influence other macroeconomic variables, including 
economic growth and unemployment rates. 
In the case of Poland such a conclusion can be drawn by, inter alia, analysing 
the discussions held by members of the Monetary Policy Council (the main 
decision-making body of the NBP) at its meetings.3 For example, when a decision 
was made to lower interest rates by 25 base points in June 2009, the decision took 
into account, inter alia, “further slowdown in economic growth in Poland” and 
                                                 
2
 In previous years those targets were: in Poland – 6-8% in 2001, 5% in 2002, and 3% in 2003; in the 
Czech Republic – 3-5% in 2001-2004, 2-4% in 2005, and 3% in 2006-2009; in Hungary – 7% in 2001, 
4.5% in 2002, 4% in 2005, and 3.5% in 2003-2004 and 2006 (www.cnb.cz; www.english.mnb.hu; 
www.nbp.pl). 
3
 At that point it is worth mentioning that pursuant to the Act on the NBP the central bank may 
support the government’s economic policy unless it restrains its primary, i.e. inflation-related, goal (the 
Act of 29 August 1997 on the National Bank of Poland, Article 3, Section 1, “Dziennik Ustaw” [Journal 
of Laws] of 2005, No. 1, Item 2). 
                                                  Interest Rate Policy Of Selected Central...                                    29 
 “risk of global long-term low economic activity” (NBP 2009, pp. 44-45). On 
the other hand, in the months to follow rates were not cut any further due to, so the 
argument went, the improved prospects for economic activity (NBP 2009, p. 55). 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that discussions on changes in interest 
rates made as a result of the economic situation were mainly focused on the fact 
that that situation impacts, first of all, on inflation, which can run above or below 
the target set by the central bank, rather than on the GDP and employment. Thus, 
it was considered that it was mainly through ensuring the relative stability of 
prices was it possible to contribute to maintaining high and lasting economic 
growth (NBP 2009, p. 55). The primary tool enabling central banks to do so 
within the DIT strategy are interest rates. Although central banks may use  
a variety of instruments, interest rates should be regarded as the most important 
among them and, at the same time, most understandable to the public.  
2. Changes in Interest Rates by the Analysed Central Banks in the 
Context of Changes in GDP, Inflation, and Unemployment 
Central banks tend to set the levels of several different interest rates – 
connected with both credit and deposit operations. Table 1 presents classification of 
basic interest rates of the European Central Bank and their counterparts applied by 
the national central banks in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. 
Table 1. Basic central bank interest rates in the euro area, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary 
Area / Country Marginal lending facility 
Main refinancing 
operations 
Deposit 
facility 
Main refinancing 
operations 
minimum bid rate 
Euro area Certificates of deposits 
Current account 
rate 
Official 
discount rate - 
Czech Republic Lombard rate Repo – 2 weeks Discount rate - 
Hungary Overnight 
collateralised loan Repo – 1 day 
Deposit – 1 
day 
Reference rate – 
2 weeks 
Poland Lombard rate Open market 
operations ref. rate Deposit rate Rediscount rate 
Source: Eurostat. 
Levels of two of the most important interest rates (determining marginal 
lending facility and main refinancing operations) – both in nominal and real terms4 
– as compared with inflation, unemployment, and economic growth rates in the 
analysed countries from 2001 to 2013 are shown in Tables 2-4.  
                                                 
4
 Real rates were deflated with current inflation. This is justified by the relatively short 
maturity of sold assets. 
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Table 2 presents the respective data for Poland. Means of the analysed 
interest rates for the whole period5 were (reference and lombard rates respectively): 
about 5.1% and 6.9%, and in real terms: about 2.5% and 4.2%. In turn, the mean 
inflation rate was about 2.8%, unemployment rate – about 13.4%, and economic 
growth rate – about 3.6%. Differentials within the discussed categories in specific 
years were usually quite considerable. In the case of inflation rate, the differential 
was 4.6 percentage points, real GDP growth rate – 5.6 percentage points, and 
unemployment rate – as much as 12.9 percentage points. In turn, the difference 
between the highest and lowest interest rate was: 9 percentage points in nominal 
terms and about 7.9 percentage points in real terms (reference rate), and 11.5 
percentage points in nominal terms and about 10.3 percentage points in real terms 
(Lombard rate), respectively. Hence, those differentials were very large too. 
Table 2. Selected macroeconomic indices in Poland from 2001 to 2013 
Year 
Interest 
ratea 
Real 
interest rateb 
Inflation 
ratec Unemployment 
rated 
Real GDP 
growth rate A B A B A B 
2001 11.50 15.50 7.63 11.50 5.3 3.6 18.3 1.2 
2002 6.75 8.75 5.90 7.89 1.9 0.8 20.0 1.4 
2003 5.25 6.75 3.59 5.07 0.7 1.6 19.8 3.9 
2004 6.50 8.00 2.01 3.45 3.6 4.4 19.1 5.3 
2005 4.50 6.00 3.67 5.16 2.2 0.8 17.9 3.6 
2006 4.00 5.50 2.56 4.04 1.3 1.4 13.9 6.2 
2007 5.00 6.50 0.77 2.21 2.6 4.2 9.6 6.8 
2008 5.00 6.50 1.65 3.10 4.2 3.3 7.1 5.1 
2009 3.50 5.00 - 0.29 1.16 4.0 3.8 8.1 1.6 
2010 3.50 5.00 0.58 2.04 2.7 2.9 9.7 3.9 
2011 4.50 6.00 0.00 1.44 3.9 4.5 9.7 4.3 
2012 4.25 5.75 2.01 3.47 3.7 2.2 10.1 2.0 
2013 2.50 4,00 1.89 3.38 0.8 0.6 10.3 1.6 
a A – Open market operations reference rate; B – Lombard rate. 
b Rounded off to two decimal places. Calculated according to the formula: real rate = (1 + nominal rate / 1 + 
HICP inflation rate December to December in a given year) – 1. A – Open market operations reference rate;  
B – Lombard rate. 
c Measured with the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). A – annual average, B – December to 
December. 
d Harmonized unemployment rate measured as the share of the unemployed in the civilian labour force – 
annual average. 
Source: Own work based on: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; sdw.ecb.europa.eu; www.nbp.pl. 
                                                 
5
 The provided mean values do not actually concern the whole period but only the final 
months in all the years. 
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In the Czech Republic (see Table 3), the mean nominal interest rates for the 
whole period were 1.9% (Repo rate) and 2.8% (Lombard rate). That meant their 
very low real levels – (-0.3)% for the former and 0.55% for the latter. Rate 
differentials were also much smaller than in Poland – 4.7 and 5.5 percentage 
points in nominal terms and about 4.95 and 5.75 percentage points (for the two 
different rates) in real terms. The mean economic growth rate, which was running 
at about 2.6% (with a considerable differential of 11.5 percentage points), was 
lower than in Poland. However, the rise in prices and lack of jobs were a slighter 
problem as the mean inflation rate was about 2.3% (with a 6.4 percentage point 
differential) and the unemployment rate – about 7% (with a slight differential of 
3.9 percentage points). 
Table 3. Selected macroeconomic indices in the Czech Republic from 2001 to 2013 
Year 
Interest 
ratea 
Real  
interest rateb 
Inflation 
ratec Unemployment 
rated 
Real GDP  
growth rate 
A B A B A B 
2001 4.75 5.75 0.82 1.78 4.5 3.9 8.1 3.1 
2002 2.75 3.75 2.65 3.65 1.4 0.1 7.3 2.1 
2003 2.00 3.00 1.09 2.08 -0.1 0.9 7.8 3.8 
2004 2.50 3.50 0.00 0.98 2.6 2.5 8.3 4.7 
2005 2.00 3.00 0.10 1.08 1.6 1.9 7.9 6.8 
2006 2.50 3.50 0.99 1.97 2.1 1.5 7.1 7.0 
2007 3.50 4.50 -1.90 -0.95 3.0 5.5 5.3 5.7 
2008 2.25 3.25 -1.02 -0.05 6.3 3.3 4.4 3.1 
2009 1.00 2.00 0.50 1.49 0.6 0.5 6.7 -4.5 
2010 0.75 1.75 -1.52 -0.54 1.2 2.3 7.3 2.5 
2011 0.75 1.75 -1.99 -1.02 2.1 2.8 6.7 1.9 
2012 0,05 0,25 -2.29 -2.10 3.5 2.4 7.0 -1.0 
2013 0,05 0,25 -1.43 -1.23 1.4 1.5 7.0 -0.9 
a A – Repo rate – 2 weeks, B –Lombard rate. 
b Rounded off to two decimal places. Calculated according to the formula: real rate = (1 + nominal rate / 1 + 
HICP inflation rate December to December in a given year) – 1. A – Repo rate – 2 weeks, B – Lombard rate. 
c Measured with the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). A – annual average, B – December to 
December. 
d Harmonized unemployment rate measured as the share of the unemployed in civilian labour force – annual 
average. 
Source: Own work based on: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; sdw.ecb.europa.eu; www.cnb.cz. 
A considerably lower stability characterized the third analysed country – 
Hungary (see Table 4). It had the decidedly highest mean inflation rate (about 
5.2% with a 7.4 percentage point differential). Its economic growth rate was also 
the lowest, at about 1.6% on average annually (with a differential of as much as 
11.6 percentage points). On the other hand, it had a mean unemployment rate for 
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the whole period at about 8.2%; hence, the rate was lower than Poland’s. Its trend, 
however, was definitely opposite as, apart from 2003, 2011 and 2013, the 
unemployment rate was constantly rising in Hungary, which made it higher than 
in Poland in the final six years (apart from 2013). 
Table 4. Selected macroeconomic indices in Hungary from 2001 to 2013 
Year 
Interest 
ratea 
Real 
interest rateb Inflation rate
c
 Unemployment 
rated 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
A B A B A B 
2001 9.75 11.25 2.76 4.17 9.1 6.8 5.6 3.7 
2002 8.50 9.50 3.43 4.39 5.2 4.9 5.6 4.5 
2003 12.50 13.50 6.53 7.48 4.7 5.6 5.8 3.9 
2004 9.50 10.50 3.79 4.74 6.8 5.5 6.1 4.8 
2005 6.00 7.00 2.61 3.58 3.5 3.3 7.2 4.0 
2006 8.00 9.00 1.31 2.25 4.0 6.6 7.5 3.9 
2007 7.50 8.50 0.09 1.02 7.9 7.4 7.4 0.1 
2008 10.00 10.50 6.38 6.87 6.0 3.4 7.8 0.9 
2009 6.25 7.25 0.81 1.76 4.0 5.4 10.0 -6.8 
2010 5.75 6.75 1.10 2.06 4.7 4.6 11.2 1.3 
2011 7.00 8.00 2.79 3.75 3.9 4.1 10.9 1.6 
2012 5.75 6.75 0.62 1.57 5.7 5.1 10.9 -1.7 
2013 3.00 4.00 2.39 3.38 1.7 0.6 10.2 1.1 
a A – Repo rate – 1 day, B – Overnight collateralised loan rate. 
b Rounded off to two decimal places. Calculated according to the formula: real rate = (1 + nominal rate / 1 + 
inflation rate December to December in a given year) – 1. A – Repo rate – 1 day, B – Overnight collateralised 
loan rate. 
c Measured with the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). A – annual average, B – December to 
December. 
d Harmonized unemployment rate measured as the share of the unemployed in civilian labour force – annual 
average. 
Source: Own work based on: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; sdw.ecb.europa.eu; english.mnb.hu. 
Despite the (usually) relatively slight increase in GDP and climbing 
unemployment, the interest rate change analysis indicates, however, that the 
National Bank of Hungary did not intensely use that tool to improve the 
economic situation, as mean nominal interest rates from 2001 to 2013 were 
respectively: 7.65% (Repo rate) and 8.65% (collateralised loan rate), considerably 
exceeding similar rates set at the other analysed central banks. Significant 
reductions in relatively high interest rates occurred principally only in 2005 
(probably as a response to the decline in inflation to the lowest level in the 
whole period) and from 2009 to 2010 (along with the global trend of lowering 
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rates as a reaction to the crisis). In real terms, due to the higher inflation, those 
rates were, however, at a level close to that observed in Poland (Repo rate – 
about 2.7%; “overnight” rate for collateralised loan – 3.6%). 
3. Deviations in the Interest Rates of Analysed Central Banks from 
Hypothetical Rates According to the Taylor Rule 
Interest rate policy may be discretionary or based on a rule. The most 
popular form of the latter is the Taylor rule, created in 1993. Its original 
algebraic form was as follows: 
r = p + 0.5 y + 0.5 (p – 2) + 2              (1) 
where: 
r – central bank interest rate,6 p – inflation rate in the last four quarters; y – 
percentage deviation of the real GDP from the potential GDP determined by the 
formula: 
y = 100 (Y – Yp ) / Y p                                                (2) 
where: 
Y – real GDP; Yp – potential real GDP. 
The author of the rule – Taylor – based it on certain assumptions. The 
most important of those was that the central bank ought to assume a target 
inflation level (inflation goal) and try to maintain it. Moreover, monetary policy 
should respond to changes in two basic values – real gross domestic product and 
inflation, which directly arises from the formula. 
If the real GDP equals the potential GDP (understood as many years’ mean) 
and inflation equals a goal set at 2% (thus, y and p – 2 in the formula (1) equal zero), 
the central bank interest rate should remain close to 4%, which implies the mean 
real interest rate of 2% (which is reflected by the last component on the right side of 
the equation) (Taylor 1993, p. 202). That rate, on the other hand, should be 
increased or reduced when the GDP deviates from its potential level and/or inflation 
deviates from the goal. If, for example, the real GDP rises by one per cent above the 
potential GDP, the interest rate should be raised – taking into account the current 
inflation rate – by 0.5 percentage point. If, additionally, inflation exceeds the goal 
by 1 percentage point, the interest rate should, due to that fact, be lifted by another 
0.5 percentage point. Therefore, the optimum level of interest rate according to the 
Taylor rule ought to be 5% in the above discussed example. 
                                                 
6
 In the original formula it was the rate of federal funds as the proposal originally concerned the US. 
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Of course, values of coefficients for deviations may be set a little differently 
than in the original formula. For instance, in analyses concerning Europe, where, 
principally, the sole legally sanctioned objective of monetary policy is to combat 
inflation, a deviation of the latter is, as a rule, given more importance than the 
GDP gap (Giammarioli, Valla 2003, p. 12; Fernandez, Gonzalez 2004, p. 23-25). 
In such a case, the monetary policy rule could take the following form: 
r = p + 0.5 y + 1.5 (p – 2) + 2                          (3) 
Thus, the only difference would be the value of the coefficient assumed 
for the deviation of the actual inflation rate from the goal. 
Table 5. Real vs. potential interest rate (according to the Taylor rule) in Poland from 2001 to 2013 
Year 
Interest rate 
calculated based on 
the Taylor rulea 
Deviation of the open market 
operations reference rate from 
the rate calculated based on 
the Taylor ruleab 
Lombard rate deviation from 
the rate calculated based on 
the Taylor ruleab 
A B A B A B 
2001 5.25 3.55 +6.25 +7.95 +10.25 +11.95 
2002 1.25 -1.85 +5.50 +8.60 +7.50 +10.60 
2003 1.70 -0.60 +3.55 +5.85 +5.05 +7.35 
2004 7.00 8.10 -0.50 -1.60 +1.00 -0.10 
2005 4.05 3.75 +0.45 +0.75 +1.95 +2.25 
2006 4.00 2.80 0.00 +1.20 +1.50 +2.70 
2007 6.25 6.35 -1.25 -1.35 +0.25 +0.15 
2008 7.80 9.50 -2.80 -4.50 -1.30 -3.00 
2009 5.75 7.25 -2.25 -3.75 -0.75 -2.25 
2010 4.95 5.15 -1.45 -1.65 +0.05 -0.15 
2011 6.95 8.35 -2.45 -3.85 -0.95 -2.35 
2012 5.50 6.70 -1.25 -2.45 +0.25 -0.95 
2013 0.95 -0.75 +1.55 +3.25 +3.05 +4.75 
a In version A, calculated assuming the coefficient for inflation deviation from the target at 0.5; in version  
B – at 1.5. 
b In percentage points. The “+” sign means an upward deviation; the “–” sign means a downward deviation. 
Source: Own work based on formulas 1 and 3 and Table 2. 
Tables 5-7 compare real interest rates at the analysed central banks with 
hypothetical rates computed according to the Taylor rule. The latter were calculated 
in two versions. In the first version, it was assumed that the coefficient for inflation 
deviation from the goal is 0.5 and in the other (which, as already mentioned, 
may be more appropriate for Europe) – 1.5. The mean annual HICP inflation 
rate was considered the inflation measure for the last four quarters. 
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Table 6. Real vs. potential interest rate (according to the Taylor rule) in the Czech Republic 
from 2001 to 2013 
Year 
Interest rate calculated 
based on 
the Taylor rulea 
Deviation of the Repo 
rate – 2 weeks 
from the rate calculated 
based on the Taylor ruleab 
Lombard rate deviation 
from the rate calculated 
based on the Taylor ruleab 
A B A B A B 
2001 7.25 7.75 -2.50 -3.00 -1.50 -2.00 
2002 1.60 -1.00 +1.15 +3.75 +2.15 +4.75 
2003 1.05 -3.05 +0.95 +5.05 +1.95 +6.05 
2004 6.00 4.60 -3.50 -2.10 -2.50 -1.10 
2005 7.10 5.70 -5.10 -3.70 -4.10 -2.70 
2006 8.05 7.15 -5.55 -4.65 -4.55 -3.65 
2007 8.10 8.10 -4.60 -4.60 -3.60 -3.60 
2008 10.45 13.75 -8.20 -11.5 -7.20 -10.50 
2009 -5.70 -8.10 +6.70 +9.10 +7.70 +10.10 
2010 2.70 1.90 -1.95 -1.15 -0.95 -0.15 
2011 3.45 3.55 -2.70 -2.80 -1.70 -1.80 
2012 2.65 4.15 -2.60 -4.10 -2.40 -3.90 
2013 -0.40 -1.00 +0.45 +1.05 +0.65 +1.25 
a In version A, calculated assuming the coefficient for inflation deviation from the target at 0.5; in version  
B – at 1.5. 
b In percentage points. The “+” sign means an upward deviation; the “-” sign means a downward deviation. 
Source: Own work based on formulas 1 and 3 and Table 3. 
Furthermore, instead of a percentage deviation of the real GDP from the 
potential GDP, deviation of the actual growth rate of the real GDP from the 
mean rate for the whole 13 years’ period was taken into account. As already 
mentioned, the mean rates for the analysed countries were (in round figures): in 
Poland – 3.6%, in the Czech Republic – 2.6%, and in Hungary – 1.6%. Also, 
actual inflation targets were assumed, slightly different from those in the 
formula presented in the previous point. Thus, instead of p – 2, for Poland, the 
third component of the discussed formula contained the following expressions:  
p – 7 (for 2001), p – 5 (for 2002), p – 3 (for 2003), and p – 2.5 (for 2004-2013).  
For the Czech Republic, the following expressions were used in calculations:  
p – 4 (for 2001-2004), p – 3 (for 2005-2009), and p – 2 (for 2010-2013). 
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In turn, for Hungary, those were:  
p – 7 (for 2001), p – 4.5 (for 2002), p – 3.5 (for 2003-2004 and 2006), p – 4 (for 
2005), and p – 3 (for 2007-2013).  
Those differences arise from different inflation goals assumed by the analysed 
central banks in the specific years (see Section 1). 
Table 7. Real vs. potential interest rate (according to the Taylor rule) in Hungary from 2001 to 2013 
Year 
Interest rate 
calculated based on 
the Taylor rulea 
Deviation of the Repo 
rate – 1 day 
from the rate calculated 
based on the Taylor ruleab 
Deviation of the 
“overnight” rate for 
collaterised loan 
from the rate calculated 
based on the Taylor ruleab 
A B A B A B 
2001 13.20 15.30 -3.45 -5.55 -1.95 -4.05 
2002 9.00 9.70 -0.50 -1.20 +0.50 -0.20 
2003 8.45 9.65 +4.05 +2.85 +5.05 +3.85 
2004 12.05 15.35 -2.55 -5.85 -1.55 -4.85 
2005 6.45 5.95 -0.45 +0.05 +0.55 +1.05 
2006 7.40 7.90 +0.60 +0.10 +1.60 +1.10 
2007 11.60 16.50 -4.10 -9.00 -3.10 -8.00 
2008 9.15 12.15 +0.85 -2.15 +1.35 -1.65 
2009 2.30 3.30 +3.95 +2.95 +4.95 +3.95 
2010 7.40 9.10 -1.65 -3.35 -0.65 -2.35 
2011 6.35 7.25 +0.65 -0.25 +1.65 +0.75 
2012 7.40 10.10 -1.65 -4.35 -0.65 -3.35 
2013 2.80 1.50 +0.20 +1.50 +1.20 +2.50 
a In version A, calculated assuming the coefficient for inflation deviation from the target at 0.5; in version  
B – at 1.5. 
b In percentage points. The “+” sign means an upward deviation; the “-” sign means a downward deviation. 
Source: Own work based on formulas 1 and 3 and Table 4. 
The presented analysis of deviations of the studied countries’ specific 
interest rates from rates determined based on the Taylor rule allows us to conclude 
that a relatively mild monetary policy, for most of the analysed period, can be 
observed only in the case of the CzNB as, apart from 2002, 2003, 2009 and 
2013, actual interest rates in the Czech Republic were lower than the hypothetical 
ones according to the Taylor rule. A particularly large difference between them 
occurred in 2008. 
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It is also worth mentioning that both the real Repo rate for 2-week operations 
and the real Lombard rate became even negative from 2007 to 2013 (apart from 
2009). Hence, that may indicate an actually excessively expansionary nature of the 
CzNB policy in those subperiods. It should be emphasized, however, that 
essentially the bank did not make abrupt changes in interest rates. The sole 
exception from the rule was its reaction to the crisis from 2009 to 2010, resulting in 
the nominal Repo rate at as little as 0.05% at the end of the studied period. 
A different attitude and more contractionary monetary policies were 
observed in Poland and Hungary. In Poland, however, that applied mainly to the 
initial years of the studied period. Comparison between actual NBP interest rates 
and rates calculated according to the Taylor rule indicates that the former ran at  
a significantly higher level in the 2001-2003 period. It is also worth recalling that, at 
that time (2002-2003), the inflation rate deviated downward below the lower margin 
of the goal, economic growth rate was relatively the lowest, and unemployment rate 
was the highest throughout the studied period. Therefore, it can be said that at the 
beginning of the studied period interest rates in Poland, although regularly lowered, 
should have been cut faster and the monetary policy was too contractionary. 
In the subsequent several-year subperiod of 2004-2006 NBP interest rates 
were decidedly closer to the hypothetical rates according to the Taylor rule. That 
may indicate a significantly more neutral nature of the monetary policy pursued at 
that time. 
Yet another conclusion can be drawn about that policy in Poland in the 
final seven years of the studied period. It seems that at that time, thanks to its 
neutral attitude to interest rate policy, the National Bank of Poland managed to 
avoid mistakes made, for example, by the US Federal Reserve System as, in 
response to the economic crisis, interest rates in Poland were reasonably 
lowered, to run at a level higher than in the Czech Republic as well as in the 
euro area. In that context it should, however, be pointed out that Poland was 
affected by the economic crisis to the smallest degree, relatively speaking. 
Moreover, more drastic cuts in rates in Poland were significantly limited by  
a strong depreciation in the Polish zloty in 2009 (Pronobis 2009, p. 112). 
That aspect aside, it ought to be emphasized that the actual NBP reference 
rate in the 2007-2012 period, and at the end of that period in particular, might have 
been even higher if compared with that computed based on the Taylor rule. Thus, it 
completely contradicts some opinions of politicians stating that the level of interest 
rates was too high in that subperiod, hampering economic growth. It should be more 
justified to say that the central bank succeeded in maintaining a “healthy” balance 
between short- and long-term objectives at that time. Admittedly, we often 
experienced “overshooting” the inflation target – both upwards and downwards. As 
a rule, however, it was not significant and inflation quickly returned to its set range. 
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Among the studied central banks, the highest nominal interest rates, apart 
from 2001, definitely occurred in Hungary. What’s more, comparison of actual 
interest rates with those calculated based on the Taylor rule indicates that the 
former were frequently too high and thus, the NBH policy was excessively 
contractionary. In the case of the Repo rate for 1-day operations, that occurred 
in 2003, 2006, 2008 (according to the A version), 2009, 2011 (according to the  
A version) and 2013. If, however, the “overnight” rate is considered, that took place 
also in 2002 (according to the A version) and 2005. 
Therefore, it may not be ruled out that the NBH interest rate policy 
contributed, to some extent, to a relatively low, as compared to the other 
countries, GDP growth. Some justification for that quite contractionary 
monetary policy was, however, firstly the decidedly highest inflation rate in 
Hungary among the studied countries, which fell below the assumed target only 
in 2005 and 2013. It is worth emphasizing that even during the crisis, which was 
accompanied by falling global demand, the inflation rate in Hungary fluctuated 
around 5%. Secondly, the contractionary monetary policy was often a response 
to an extremely expansionary budgetary policy7. Hence, to some extent, the high 
interest rates might have been justified as they prevented an even higher 
inflation. On the other hand, such a mix of macroeconomic policy causes a strong 
crowding out effect through a rise in all kinds of interest rates as, along with 
increased central bank rates, an excessive deficit makes it necessary to offer 
high interest on treasury bonds. 
4. Conclusions 
The monetary policy of every central bank is carried out in specific 
economic conditions. Those conditions are sometimes difficult to completely 
identify and understand. However, when evaluating monetary policies followed 
by the analysed central banks, attention should be drawn to the fact that the 
applicable legislation clearly specifies that their activity is to bring about beneficial 
economic effects in the long run. That is to be achieved by preventing an excessive 
rise in prices, which is currently the sole final goal of each of those banks. 
The conducted analysis reveals that the studied central banks pursued that 
very objective to the largest extent. Thus, interest rates were changed, first and 
                                                 
7
 During the years 2001–2010 the public finance sector deficit in Hungary was never 
particularly close to meeting the Maastricht reference value of 3%. A very high level of that 
deficit was recorded especially from 2002 to 2006 when it ranged from 6.4% (2004) to 9.3% 
(2006) (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). 
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foremost, in response to inflation rate changes. Taking into consideration the 
whole studied period, the analysed central banks seem to have avoided mistakes 
consisting in the excessively expansionary nature of their policies made, for 
instance, in the United States. One can, admittedly, wonder whether the monetary 
policy in the Czech Republic should not have sometimes been a little more 
contractionary (e.g. from 2007 to 2008). On the other hand, an opposite objection, 
of the excessively contractionary nature of policies, seems to be substantiated in the 
case of Hungary and, at the beginning of the studied period, Poland. Nevertheless, 
mistakes made in those countries were still smaller than in the US. 
It is already possible to state with a high degree of probability that the 
extremely expansionary policy of the US Federal Reserve System (Fed) was co-
responsible for the global 2008–2009 economic crisis. Such an opinion is actually 
also expressed by the author of the Taylor rule, who claims that one of the most 
important factors behind the crisis was the excessively expansionary interest 
rate policy in the US from 2002 to 2006 (especially in the 2003-2004 subperiod) 
as at that time the rates were set at a level considerably lower than that arising 
from the rule he proposed (Taylor 2007, p. 5). 
The analysis conducted in this study indicates, admittedly, that the Taylor 
rule was not commonly applied by all of the three analysed central banks. In 
consequence, interest rates set by them sometimes significantly differed from 
the hypothetical levels determined based on the discussed rule (either exceeded 
or were lower than the hypothetical rates). Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing 
yet again that the discretionary interest rate policies of the analysed central 
banks did not appear to be as erroneous as those in the US, maintaining an 
appropriate level of macroeconomic rationality. 
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Streszczenie 
 
POLITYKA STOPY PROCENTOWEJ WYBRANYCH BANKÓW  
CENTRALNYCH W EUROPIE ŚRODKOWO-WSCHODNIEJ 
 
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie i ocena polityki stopy procentowej trzech 
wybranych banków centralnych Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej (Polski, Czech i Węgier)  
w latach 2001–2011. Opracowanie składa się z wprowadzenia i dwóch części zasadniczych  
i podsumowania. We wprowadzeniu (p. 1) zawarto teoretyczny opis roli polityki stopy 
procentowej, dylematów z nią związanych, a także analizę strategii i celów polityki 
monetarnej Narodowego Banku Polskiego (NBP), Narodowego Banku Czeskiego (NBCz) 
oraz Narodowego Banku Węgier (NBW) w kontekście obowiązujących uwarunkowań 
prawno-instytucjonalnych. Z kolei w pierwszej części empirycznej (p. 2) sprawdzono,  
w jaki sposób analizowane banki centralne reagowały na zmiany stóp inflacji, bezrobocia 
i wzrostu gospodarczego. Jako instrumenty analizy przyjęto nominalne i realne stopy 
procentowe tych banków. W następnej części badawczej (p. 3) podjęto próbę oceny stopnia 
restrykcyjności polityki stopy procentowej w poszczególnych krajach w kontekście reguły 
Taylora. Całość zamknięto podsumowaniem (p. 4), zawierającym wnioski z przeprowadzonych 
wcześniej analiz.  
 
Słowa kluczowe: polityka pieniężna, stopa procentowa, reguła Taylora 
